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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
The Kremlin's foreign policy (succession struggle with a twist) 
A cool wind has been blowing this summer, down from the Urals Mountains and 
across Europe and the North Atlantic.  It seems clear that the Kremlin couldn't 
have ordered the breeze, but the timing of the fresh sweep of air seems 
auspicious for the Putin regime.  
 
One of the strange hallmarks of the early run on Putin successor candidates and 
possible succession/succession-avoidance strategies have been the attempt by 
disparate Kremlin denizens to float ideological, geographical and simply 
opportunistic policies in order to further their (or their group's) claim to rightful (or 
plausible) succession.  Western-oriented, so-called liberal advisers seek to 
attract western business and investment, which enhances either the personal, or 
often campaign, funds of their chosen succession candidates, while the siloviki 
push Chinese energy deals and armaments sales to bolster their campaign war 
chests.  With a faint echo of the Yel'tsin years, this second Putin term has 
seemed more consumed with resolving succession than initiating policy.  
Ideological trial balloons, such as Surkov's recently withdrawn "sovereign 
democracy," have floated off aimlessly and fruitlessly beyond the horizon. 
 
After more than a decade of searching for an actual doctrinal compass, foreign 
policy and, perhaps more importantly, perceived foreign policy successes, finally 
have gripped Russian policy makers.  The causes of the change in the wind are 
myriad and murky:  perhaps it is petrodollars and the confidence of a strong 
economy; strict opportunism in leveraging a wedge between European allies and 
the US; or possibly his years of labor have once again borne fruit for perennial 
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mid-east policy guru, Yevgeni Primakov.  Whatever the cause, an outline of a 
comprehensive plan comes into focus. 
 
Putin's Russia seemed, at first, unsure whether to pluck the nationalist string or 
to continue Yel'tsin's quasi-cooperation with the west.  The aftermath of the 
terrorist attack in the US on September 11, 2001, appeared to settle the dispute:  
Putin reached out to President Bush after the attack, and Russia seemed poised 
both to cooperate with the United States across a wide array of policies, from 
staging US troops out of Central Asia to providing support in the war in 
Afghanistan, and to justify its Chechen wars through the lens of a wider Islamic 
fundamentalist threat.  (1) 
 
Russia either decided that cooperation with the west did not reap worthwhile 
benefits, or found opposition to the west more suited to its purposes.  In either 
event, Russia clearly now has developed an independent, provocative foreign 
policy that seeks friends in similar places where the Soviets found them (in direct 
confrontation with allies and friends of the US, and sometimes the west more 
generally).  
 
The growing disconnect in Russian-US relations became inescapable in October 
2005, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice interrupted a planned short 
hop from Paris to London, to fly instead to Moscow and meet with President 
Putin at Novo Ogaryovo.  (2)  The topic of the talks could not have been more 
relevant or prescient:  The prevention of the spread of WMD with regard to Iran 
and the disarming of illegal formations in southern Lebanon.  According to 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's account of the meeting, "Special attention was 
riveted to Iran and the situation in the Middle East due to the events in Lebanon 
and Syria." (3) 
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The questions that remain for policy formulation in the Kremlin are clear enough:  
Who is making the decisions and how to address the Chechen situation in order 
to resolve Russia's confrontation with Islamic terrorism? 
 
The answer to the first question may well be that Yevgeni Primakov is once again 
masterminding mid-east policy in the Kremlin—at least he can propose policy 
without being thought a reasonable successor, i.e. threat, to Putin.  The answer 
to the second question was unclear until Russia's security services were dealt a 
lucky wild card:  Shamil Basayev's death by accidental explosion.  
 
With the death of Basayev, Russia has but one task left in Chechnya:  To leave 
it.  Not even bothering to declare victory, Russian troops and security forces are 
withdrawing from the region—the Chechen issue, while not actually resolved, no 
longer seems to require active intervention.  (4)  While the decision to walk away 
from Chechnya likely will have serious repercussions yet (certainly for Ramzan 
Kadyrov), it seems to have freed Russian policy making on two distinct, yet 
connected, fronts. 
 
First, the issue of control of energy resources is paramount to Kremlin thinking.  
Pipeline issues that have sputtered for more than a decade now quietly have 
resolved, and thus spawned more debates about increasing the number and 
variety of transit routes.  Putin's Russia clearly is poised to exert maximal 
authority on the choice of routes and control of the territories they would traverse.  
(Clearly, Russia's monopoly of energy resources has weighed heavily on the 
decisions of area politicians, such as Ukraine's President Yushchenko).  
 
It is perhaps with this issue in mind that events in Georgia seem to be moving 
inexorably closer to conflict.  The opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline was attended less, perhaps, by fanfare in Russia, than with careful 
planning and weighing of options.  The recent dustup in the Kodori Gorge 
(Please see Caucasus section below) suggests that the Georgian leadership is 
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aware that Russian sights are fixed squarely on it, and perhaps are anxious 
themselves to demonstrate a preparedness, if not an inclination, to reduce the 
tension by military means. 
 
In addition to the regional and energy-related dominance issues, Russia seems 
to be front and center as an old-style debate about the wealth and status of 
states re-emerges.  In the current conception, the US stands in for the 
colonial/imperial aggressor state, and Russia casts itself as the defender of the 
downtrodden: The image is reinforced in such disparate events as the recent visit 
of President Chavez of Venezuela with Putin in Moscow to the debate over the 
health status of Castro ("recent" pictures of whom are very reminiscent of 
photographs released of Yel'tsin in between rounds of the 1996 elections), even 
to the Iranian President, who characterizes the US now as the "great oppressor," 
and who claimed recently: "We are opposed to oppression....We support 
whoever is victimized and oppressed even the oppressed people of the U.S." (5)  
Even the language of discussion hearkens back to the days of Cold War 
confrontation, to the anti-colonial and non-aligned movements, and to the 
attempts to organize states in an "us versus them" schematic. 
 
During an earlier iteration of this debate, the Soviet Union professed solidarity 
with Third World states and their struggles with colonial bonds.  It will be 
interesting to assess, should the current level of discourse continue, just how a 
Russian state justifies military engagement with or even economic strong arming 
of former Soviet satellite states that can never quite break free of Russian 
imperial interference in their sovereign domestic affairs.  Or how the Kremlin 
reconciles condemnation of the west with appeals to foreign investment. (6) 
 
The inherent contradictions in Russia's current foreign policy approach, coupled 
with the volatility of an intra-Kremlin skirmish over succession (masquerading, of 
course, as policy debate), make Russia a difficult partner in international affairs, 
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and already may have weakened its long term prospects to fulfill short term 
agendas.  Wind directions can shift at a moment's notice. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Shevtsova, Lilia.  Putin's Russia.  (Translated by Antonina W. Bouis).  
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005 (Revised, 
expanded edition).  See pages 199-215 for a general discussion of Putin's early 
foreign policy approaches and response to 9/11. 
(2) Agence France Presse, 13 Oct 06 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Search. 
(3) Itar-Tass (Novo Ogaryovo), 15 Oct 05 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Search. 
(4) See for instance, "Russia Wrapping Up its War Against Terror," Pavel Baev, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 3, Number 157, 14 Aug 06.  (Jamestown 
Foundation). 
(5) "Iranian Leader Opens Up," Report of interview with Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad by Mike Wallace, 60 Minutes television program (aired 13 Aug 06), 
via 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/09/60minutes/main1879867_page4.shtml. 
(6) According to President Putin's press service, Putin opened a meeting with 
Boeing management at Novo Ogaryovo on 11 August 06 by saying, “We will be 
happy to support the development of your business and your activities in Russia.” 
www.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/speeches.shtml. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
Regional Review: The Urals –A Military Fracas, Elections, Population 
Initiatives and Security Issues 
Military Fracas 
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Chelyabinsk is the home of the Chelyabinsk Tank School, the site of a 
particularly gruesome military hazing incident that has incited public outrage. In 
January 2006, RF Armed Forces Private Andrei Sychev was beaten and tortured 
by fellow servicemen, then left without medical care for three days. By the time 
he did receive medical attention, his legs and genitals had to be amputated. 
 
The Sychev case is being tried in the Chelyabinsk military court in an open trial. 
Early in the proceedings, two of the three defendants, Pavel Kuzmenko and 
Gennadi Bilimovich, pleaded guilty to the charge that they violated the code of 
army discipline, but denied that their involvement had been premeditated. 
Kuzmenko and Bilimovich face up to five years in prison. The third defendant, 
Junior Sergeant Aleksandr Sivyakov, has pleaded not guilty to the charge of 
abuse of office and use of physical violence. (1)  Sivyakov’s charges carry a ten-
year prison sentence if he is convicted. 
 
The Russian media have reported that the office of the Prosecutor General had 
pressured the witnesses in the Sychev case. Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika 
(who replaced Vladimir Ustinov in June) charged his new Chief Military 
Prosecutor Sergei Fridinsky with investigating the substance of these reports. (2)  
Several weeks after receiving his charge, the new appointee indicated that he 
had not even read the preliminary investigation report, choosing instead to leave 
the outcome to the courts. (3)  Unsurprisingly then, Fridinsky's "investigation" into 
witness tampering doesn't seem to be curbing the problem— one of the 
witnesses in the case, Ivan Dodzhiyev, suddenly refused to testify after being 
detained at the prosecutor’s office for 24 hours. (4) 
 
Witness tampering by the Defense Ministry might also be a concern. Two 
witnesses in the case, Oleg Makarin and Sergei Gorlov, said that before the trial 
they had been spoken to by two men who claimed to be generals from Moscow. 
The men threatened Makarin and Gorlov with criminal prosecution if they testified 
in the Sychev case. (5)  Also, Makarin, one of the chief witnesses on whose 
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testimony the prosecution's case hinged, also mysteriously disappeared for 
almost a week in July. (6)  
 
The Sychev case has brought to the surface the ongoing tension between the 
Defense Ministry under Sergei Ivanov and the office of the Military Prosecutor 
under former Chief Military Prosecutor Aleksandr Savenkov. (7)  However, 
Sergei Fridinsky's appointment appears to represent a cessation of hostilities 
between the two organs. Fridinsky has stated that tension should not exist 
between the two offices (although one is technically investigating the other!). (8) 
 
Elections 
There are several regions in Russia scheduled to hold new parliamentary 
elections on 8 October of this year. Among them is the Sverdlovsk region. United 
Russia is gearing up to win those elections by its usual tactics—lining up 
prominent and popular regional leaders to hold the top places on its party lists. 
Generally, these well-known individuals run for office and then give up their 
positions to other members of the United Russia party. Among the political 
figures playing that game in Sverdlovsk this time around are Eduard Rossel, 
Sverdlovsk’s governor, and the popular biathlon athlete Sergei Chepikov, who 
will run third on the lists. (9)  Rossel recently met with State Duma Speaker and 
head of United Russia Boris Gryzlov to discuss the upcoming elections. (10) 
 
Population Initiatives 
Population decline is a serious issue in several regions of the Urals Federal 
District, as in many Russian regions. Some areas have taken measures to 
counteract this phenomenon and lure new settlers into the region. Among these 
initiatives is a new program with China. The Sverdlovsk and Tyumen regions are 
seeking an agreement with the Heilongjiang province of China whereby Chinese 
farmers would work Russian farms in order to ameliorate a Russian labor 
shortage. Sverdlovsk has 247,000 acres of abandoned land that needs to be 
farmed because of a declining population. The authorities have already tried to 
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tempt Russians to the task by offering a 1,200 ruble bonus per hectare cultivated. 
The agreement between the Russian regions and Heilongjiang would include the 
provision that Chinese farmers must sell their produce locally. (11)  
 
In addition to seeking Chinese recruits for agricultural labor, the Tyumen region 
also is taking another tack. The region recently put forth an initiative to recruit 
ethnic Russians from other countries to work in what it hopes will become a 
flourishing tourist trade. According to the region's deputy governor Sergei 
Degtyar, Tyumen is primarily looking to employ "tourist operators and 
entertainment services specialists." (12) 
 
Security Issues  
On 28 July, President Vladimir Putin fired the chief of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs Main Directorate for the Urals Federal District Aleksei Krasnikov without 
explanation. (13)  Director of the Federal Security Services (FSB) Nikolai 
Patrushev recently identified the Urals Federal District as the location of activity 
by some terrorist organizations. (14)  A major security issue for the Urals Federal 
District is the drug trade. The trafficking of heroin, for example, has shown a 
major increase over the last year. Authorities have confiscated over 1300 kg of 
heroin in the first six months of this year compared to a total of 1674 kg of heroin 
for all of 2005. (15) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Two defendants in Sychev hazing case partially admit guilt, 6 Jul 06, Ria 
Novosti via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Prosecutor orders inquiry into media coverage of army incident, 7 Jul 06, 
TASS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) No confrontation between military prosecutors and the Defense Ministry, 27 
Jul 06, What the Papers Say, Part A via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(4) Prosecution witnesses in Sychev case contradict each other, 9 Aug 06, 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis.  
(5) Prosecution witnesses in Sychev case contradict each other, 9 Aug 06, 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Witness in Andrei Sychev case disappeared, 25 Jul 06, Gazeta via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(7) Military prosecutors get a command: Order arms!, 7 Aug 06, What the Papers 
Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) No confrontation between military prosecutors and the Defense Ministry, 27 
Jul 06, What the Papers Say, Part A via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Dana Guseva, The bear’s appetite, 3 Aug 06, What the Papers Say, Part B 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) One Russia leader meets Urals governor to discuss forthcoming party 
congress, 8 Aug 06, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Russian region seeks Chinese farmers to fill workforce gap, 2 Aug 06, 
Agence France-Presse via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Tyumen region invites ethnic Russians to step up tourist industry, 3 Jul 06, 
TASS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Russian President dismisses Urals region interior chief, 28 Jul 06, BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(14) Struggle against Al Qaeda became one of the main tasks of the Federal 
Security Service after elimination of Basayev, 26 Jul 06, Izvestia via Lexis-Nexis.  
(15) Large consignment of heroin seized in Russian Urals, 20 Jul 06, Interfax via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Update: Iraq murders--A Chechen connection? 
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Early in June, four Russian diplomats working in Baghdad were kidnapped by 
insurgents. Several days later, a group calling itself “The Mujaheddin Shura 
Council” took responsibility for the abductions, and demanded a full Russian exit 
from Chechnya in exchange for the diplomats’ safe return. (1)  Three weeks after 
their abduction, the kidnappers released a video that apparently showed the 
execution of some of the hostages.   
    
President Vladimir Putin’s response to the murders was to order Russia’s Secret 
Services to “find and destroy” the killers—an assignment FSB Director Nikolai 
Patrushev enthusiastically took up, claiming his agency would “ensure that the 
terrorists…would answer for their actions.” (2)  Sources close to Russia’s other 
security agencies indicated that the hunt for the killers might be the vehicle for an 
internecine territorial war (3), but it now seems that the investigation is being 
shared by all of Russia’s intelligence agencies and coordinated by the National 
Anti-Terrorist Committee. (4)  
   
On 27 July, Rossiyskaya Gazeta  published an interview with Major General Yuri 
Sapunov, head of the FSB’s anti-terrorism directorate. Sapunov claimed that 
“Chechen terrorist leaders Shamil Basayev, separatist President Dokka Umarov, 
and Akhmed Zakayev may have been involved” in the kidnapping and murders. 
(5)  Sapunov alleged that Zakayev had connections to Al-Qaeda, and that 
Chechenpress, the separatist news agency, had carried congratulatory 
statements to the Iraqi guerrillas in its dispatches. Sapunov further claimed that 
the FSB possessed documentary evidence to this effect and had passed  this 
evidence on to the Prosecutor-General’s office. (6)   Sapunov’s statements would 
seem to be supported by Patrushev, who claimed that there would be 
satisfactory “final results” in the case in the near future.  
    
The documents cited by Sapunov have not been made public yet, so the FSB’s 
conclusion must be viewed with some skepticism. While there may be ties 
between Iraqi insurgents and Chechen rebel groups, such links, and a 
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“congratulatory” note in the press by no means constitute proof of Chechen 
instigation or even direct involvement in the murder of the diplomats. At this 
juncture, it is more likely that the Russian National Anti-Terrorist Committee 
needs a quick result from the investigation, and that the FSB is therefore blaming 
its most convenient target—the Chechen separatists. 
 
FSB colonel sentenced in espionage case 
In December 2004, Colonel Sergei Skripal, a former intelligence officer, was 
arrested on charges of treason. The investigation into his case, which took 18 
months, apparently revealed that he had worked for Britain’s Secret Intelligence 
Service (MI6) for almost nine years between 1995 and 2004. (7)  Skripal 
apparently was recruited while on assignment abroad during the early 1990s, 
and continued to pass information to his controllers even after his retirement in 
1999. (8) 
    
During his trial, which ended on 10 August, prosecutors detailed Skripal’s career 
as a double-agent, noting that he had been paid more than $100,000 and that he 
had blown the identities of “several dozen” Russian agents working in European 
countries, causing “significant damage” to the defense and security of the 
Russian state. (9)  Skripal was sentenced to thirteen years in a high security 
penal camp. Apparently, the court declined the twenty year maximum possible 
sentence, due to Skripal’s admission of guilt and “active cooperation” with 
investigators. (10)  
    
Overall, Skripal’s case is unremarkable: Russian courts have convicted a number 
of individuals, including Igor Sutyagin and Valentin Danilov, on espionage 
charges in the last few years. Yet there is one issue in Skripal’s case that raises 
questions—namely, that of his status. Specifically, it is unclear which agency he 
worked for. He has been described by various newspapers as a GRU officer, an 
FSB officer, and simply as an intelligence officer. The FSB’s public relations 
office has declined to specify which agency employed him. (11)  It seems fair to 
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conclude that the FSB’s silence speaks volumes: If Skripal were a former GRU 
officer, the FSB likely would be trumpeting his activities as evidence of said 
agency’s unreliability, as well as using his case to attempt to usurp the GRU’s 
territory. 
 
Update: A return to Soviet-style borders 
In the spring of 2005, signs emerged indicating that Russia was about to embark 
on a long-term project to improve its border security. First, in May, General 
Vladimir Pronichev, commander of the Border Guards Service, announced a R15 
billion program designed to upgrade border fortifications in Southern Russia 
using satellite, radar and television technology. (12)  Pronichev’s announcement 
was followed in September 2005 by Lieutenant General Viktor Trufanov’s 
(Pronichev’s deputy) announcement that the Border Guards budget for 2006 
contained R6.2 billion for the construction of new border installations, as well as 
R1.6 billion to smooth the transition (by 2008) to a fully professional service. (13)  
In the last few weeks, it has become clear that there is a further aspect to 
Russia’s border reforms—namely the re-creation of Soviet-style border zones.  
    
An article in Kommersant, on 2 August, described a number of legislative 
packages (signed earlier this year), which reorganized Russia's border zones on 
a significant scale. In March-June, FSB Director Patrushev signed into law 
directives expanding the border zones in each of Russia’s regions. In most 
regions, the border zones have been expanded from 5 to 30 kilometers, closing 
off vast swathes of territory to public access. (14)  The new border regime will 
place a total of about 550,000 square kilometers of land under strict FSB control. 
(15) 
 
Some of the expanded border zones, most notably the "maritime" area around 
Vladivostok (bordering China and North Korea), are to be declared “closed 
areas,” which means that people inhabiting those areas will be able to travel only 
with explicit FSB authorization. (16)   
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The new regime will introduce strict access controls reminiscent of the Soviet 
period, whereby those wishing to enter or traverse the zones will be required to 
supply authorities with identification documents, proof of Russian citizenship, and 
documents providing a detailed explanation for the purpose of their visit.  
Moreover, the FSB will have the right to monitor all activities, including 
businesses operating within the zones. (17)  
    
The FSB has insisted that the new rules are “designed to create the best 
possible conditions…for guarding the border and ensuring state security” (18) 
and claims that local approval is required in each region, before zones are 
expanded. (19)  If this is the case, the complaint made by Maritime Territory 
Governor Sergei Darkin will not go unheeded. Darkin has criticized border zone 
expansion in the Vladivostok region, claiming that it “infringes on the rights of 
citizens.”(20)  Darkin’s comments likely will fall on deaf ears: it seems evident 
that the FSB’s “reassurances” are designed purely for public consumption. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 7 (20 Jul 06).  
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Behind The Breaking News, Volume IV, Number 3 (27 Jul 06). 
(4) “FSB Director Says Case of Russian Diplomats’ Murder in Iraq Will Be 
Solved”, ITAR-TASS, 2 Aug 06; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(5) “Russian Security Service Says Chechens May Be Behind Diplomats’ 
Murders In Iraq,” RIA-Novosti, 27 Jul 06; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
(6) Ibid.  
(7) “Russia: FSB Spokesman Gives More Details on Colonel Convicted of 
Treason,” Interfax, 9 Aug 06; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
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(8) “Russia Jails MI6 Double Agent In Echo Of Cold War,” The Independent, 10 
Aug 06 via www.independent.co.uk.  
(9) “MI6 Mole Is Jailed By Russians For 13 Years,” Times of London, 10 Aug 06 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) “Colonel Convicted Of Spying For MI6,” Moscow Times, 10 Aug 06 via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(11) Ibid.  
(12) The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 4 (15 Jun 06).  
(13) Ibid.  
(14) “Russia Is Re-Establishing Soviet Borders,” Kommersant, 2 Aug 06; What 
the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.  
(15) Ibid. 
(16) “Expanded Border Zones Mean New Bribes,” Center TV, 2 Aug 06 via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(17) “New Rules Double Size of Restricted Border Zone in Parts of Northwest 
Russia,” Agentsvo Voyennykh Novostey WWW Text, 8 Aug 06; OSC Translated 
Text via World News Connection.  
(18) Ibid.  
(19) “FSB Chief Says Widening Border Zones Requires Local Approval,” Interfax, 
2 Aug 06; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(20) “Russian Governor Criticizes Expansion of Restricted Border Zone,” Interfax, 
8 Aug 06; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
From G8 to little 8 
Perhaps taking a cue from the rather unproductive G8 summit, Russia hosted 
another meeting that accomplished little – an informal CIS summit. The G8 
deserves a little credit—at least all of its members showed up. The CIS summit 
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did not even accomplish that—only eight out of the 12 CIS presidents made an 
appearance, prompting Russian journalists to christen the meeting the “Little 8.” 
(1) 
 
President of Turkmenistan “Turkmenbashi” Saparmurat Niyazov became the first 
to decline Putin’s invitation to the informal summit in Moscow. Turkmenbashi, 
who is known for his eccentricities (he renamed the month of January after 
himself in 2002) (2), surprised no one with his absence since he has a reputation 
of skipping CIS summits. His official excuse? He was on vacation. (3) 
 
However, the absence of the other three presidents who opted out, Armenia's 
Aleksandr Kocharian, Ukraine's Viktor Yushchenko, and Georgia's Mikheil 
Saakashvili, gave journalists and analysts reason to speculate about the future of 
the CIS.  
 
Kocharian claimed that he did not attend on account of illness. It is likely that 
Kocharian’s excuse is legitimate, as he has been an active member in CIS 
activities in the past. (4)  However, it is worth noting that Armenia and Russia are 
experiencing minor tensions due to Russia’s 8 July decision to close the 
Kazbegi-Verkhny Lars border, a popular export route for Armenian goods. The 
Russian decision has prompted multiple statements from the Armenian 
government: On 10 July, Vaan Ovannisyan, a deputy chairman of Armenia’s 
parliament demanded that Russia “be more flexible and careful” in its relations 
with Georgia as “each step against Georgia also hurts Armenia’s interests.” (5)  
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian gave a follow-up statement urging a 
quick solution to the route's closing: “The Russian side works for the settlement 
of the issue and we keep in touch with them, hoping that the solution to the 
problem will soon be found.” (6)  Despite these statements of frustration, 
Oskanian’s soft language helps to back up Kocharian’s coincidental absence. 
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The absences of Ukraine’s Yushchenko and Georgia’s Saakashvili seem hardly 
coincidental, however. Yushchenko's relationship with the Kremlin has been 
contentious ever since he defeated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s candidate 
for President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, in the Orange Revolution. 
Yushchenko explained his absence by referring to the current “political situation” 
in Ukraine. (7)  Since March, the Ukrainian government has been in shambles, 
due to the falling-out between the Orange Coalition parties. While the situation 
was looking poor for the former Orange Coalition parties, Yanukovich's (and, 
therefore Russia's) expectations were looking up. On 11 July, a new coalition 
between the Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Party 
nominated Yanukovich for prime minister, prompting mêlées between this so-
called “anti-crisis” coalition and members of former Orange Coalition leader Yulia 
Tymoshenko's party. (8)  On 14 July, Yushchenko threatened to call new 
parliamentary elections amid accusations of “violations of the constitution and 
procedures” in Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovnaya Rada. (9)  By the weekend 
of the CIS summit, the situation had deteriorated even further. The Tymoshenko 
bloc continued to boycott parliament while Yushchenko set aside 15 days to think 
about Yanukovich’s nomination (theoretically leaving him time to partake in the 
two-day CIS summit had he truly wanted to). (10)  Therefore, Yushchenko’s 
absence could be a bad omen for Ukraine’s future membership in the CIS. 
 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s absence was by far the most politically 
motivated of the no-shows. Although the government officially cited “important 
questions linked to [Saakashvili’s] cabinet,” as the reason for his absence, 
insiders attributed the last-minute decision to Putin’s refusal to meet tête-à-tête 
with Saakashvili to discuss Russia’s “peacekeeping” mission in Georgia’s 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. (11) 
 
On 18 July, Georgia's parliament voted nearly unanimously to expel Russian 
troops, which it dubbed "the main barrier to a peaceful resolution," from Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. (12)  Saakashvili did not respond to the parliament’s decision 
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right away, opting instead to wait until he spoke with Putin during the CIS 
summit. However, Putin pulled out of the talks at the last minute signaling to 
Saakashvili that he was not ready for a dialogue. (13) 
 
Saakashvili’s decision not to attend the summit reflects the poor state of Russian-
Georgian relations, which have degenerated once again due to Georgia's military 
operation in the Kodori Gorge against a local pro-Russian guerilla group. More 
importantly, his absence signals that Georgia may want out of the CIS altogether, 
which could further dampen hopes for resolution of the problems between 
Moscow and Tbilisi over the breakaway regions. Moscow’s “peacekeepers” 
operate under the guise of an “international” CIS mandate. If Georgia withdraws 
from the CIS, it may lead to increased international support for the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from its territory. However, it must be noted that under 
international law, Georgia’s current objection to Russian troops on its sovereign 
soil should be enough to expel the “peacekeepers,” regardless of Georgia’s CIS 
membership. 
 
With four countries opting out of the summit, the future of the CIS is in question. 
The CIS took another blow during the Little 8 summit when President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan submitted a series of proposals to weaken further the 
Moscow-centered CIS. 
 
Nazarbayev’s proposal would reduce the CIS from an integration organization to 
a G8-like organization, whose main function would be to harmonize members’ 
policies on five issues: migration, transportation, education, security and 
humanitarian assistance. (14) 
 
Nazarbayev noted that in the past 15 years only about 10 percent of CIS 
resolutions have come into effect. However, he has not lost hope. Despite his 
calls for reform, Nazarbayev, who currently holds the rotating presidency of the 
organization, said his proposals would allow for “breathing a new life into the 
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Commonwealth,” at which point further cooperation, particularly more unified 
views on foreign affairs, could be reached. (15) 
 
Putin remained silent directly after the summit, but many Russian pundits 
predicted the death of the CIS: Dmitri Oreshkin, chief of the analytical group 
Mercator, told Ekho Moskvy radio, “The CIS is a typical post-Soviet structure. 
People get together, talk to each other, observe the protocol and then leave, 
having not a shade of doubt that the agreement achieved isn't worth a dime…in 
the place of the CIS there may emerge something qualitatively new.” Boris 
Makarenko, the Political Technologies Center’s first deputy general director, said, 
“The CIS is dying, but in its place there will appear such viable organizations as 
the EurAsEC, CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” (16) 
 
While other organizations may exist that allow the CIS countries to remain 
economically connected, the possible demise of the CIS would be a political blow 
for Russia, since it has long been considered the hegemon of the group. Proof of 
the CIS’s importance came last year after Putin’s administration "clarified" a 
statement made by Putin  that claimed the main function of the CIS was to 
ensure a “civilized divorce” between the former Soviet states. Lavrov explained 
what Putin meant when he stated that the CIS was a “civilized divorce” 
mechanism: Putin “did not mean to say that this was the organization’s sole 
purpose and that there were no other purposes. On the contrary, a ‘civilized 
divorce’ certainly does not rule out integration; rather, it can help to intensify it.” 
(17) 
 
Lavrov’s immediate clean-up of Putin’s words seems to signal that Russia, 
indeed, still needs the CIS, if not as a means to separate from its neighboring 
former Soviet states, then perhaps as a mechanism to continue to influence them 
despite the separation. Decreased political cooperation between the CIS states 
would give the weaker CIS states more incentive to look for partnerships apart 
from Russia, perhaps even with the West, as Georgia and Ukraine have done.  
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It is not unimportant to note that this past CIS summit was considered “informal.” 
The closed-door talks lasted less than two hours and were followed by an 
afternoon at the racetrack. The true litmus test of the CIS’s health will come 
during the formal summit in October in Minsk. If only the Little 8 show up again, 
then the political future of the CIS almost certainly will be dark. 
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Russian Federation: Special Feature 
By Jeffrey R. Dickerson 
 
Russia and Iran’s evolving relationship 
Recent activities show that economic, political, and military cooperation between 
Russia and Iran has increased dramatically in the past few years, particularly in 
regard to their relationship with China, but most significantly with the US and the 
West. The ties that bind the two are not temporary, fragile, incidental, or 
transparent, and will certainly tighten, against the aspirations of the Western 
world, in the coming years. 
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Political rhetoric aside, there is abundant evidence that Iran faces an energy 
crisis in the near future. Muhammad Sahimi writes in the Harvard International 
Review that “if Iran does not increase oil production significantly, it will become a 
net importer of oil over the next decade, a huge catastrophe for a nation that 
obtains 80 percent of its total export earnings and 45 percent of its total annual 
budget from exporting oil.” (1)  The problem derives not from the depletion of 
Iran’s resources, but rather in their use: unrefined oil is currently burned to supply 
18% of Iran’s electric needs, compounding revenue costs with environmental and 
health costs. (2)  Iran also imports and subsidizes gasoline, at a cost of $4.5 
billion in 2006, a sad irony for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ 
(OPEC’s) second-largest petroleum exporter. (3)  In addition, Iran consumes its 
own natural gas (it contains over 15% of the world’s proven reserves) as a 
source of energy. (4)  For viable economic growth to occur in support of a 
population that has doubled in the past three decades, Iran requires investment 
in its aging production facilities, more efficient means of energy production, 
employment opportunities, and the ability to consume less and sell more of its 
natural resources on the world market. 
 
These challenges are not easily overcome by a nation that has faced nearly 
three decades of international sanctions, which have created a technological 
disparity in Iran. Due to the lack of a legal market for infrastructure investment, 
dependency on outdated energy production capabilities has coupled with a lack 
of modern consumption technology to result in wasteful energy practices, 
exacerbated by high population growth rates. Russia and China have assisted 
and traded with Iran: China has vowed to invest in the expansion and renovation 
of Iran’s facilities in exchange for a secure flow of energy, (5) while Russia has 
assisted Iran in building its Bushehr nuclear power plant: “In 1995 Iran signed a 
contract with Russia to resume work on the partially complete Bushehr plant, 
installing into the existing Bushehr I building a 915MWe VVER-1000 pressurized 
water reactor, with completion expected in 2007. The Russian state-controlled 
company Atomstroieksport (Atomic Construction Export), an arm of Russia's 
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atomic energy ministry, MinAtom, is constructing the plant.” (6)  This nuclear 
cooperation between Russia and Iran is particularly worrying to the US, which 
sees the growing relationship between the two energy giants as “strange” 
according to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. (7) 
 
A military bond between Russia and Iran also has been developing. Certain 
initiatives, such as the Caspian Sea Force (CasFor), have floundered, but the 
initiative to create regional alliances at least indicates cooperative intent. (8)  The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has the most potential to unite Russia 
and Iran under a regional Inter-Governmental Organization (IGO), if Iran should 
succeed in gaining admittance; Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammadi 
believed that Iran would become a member of the SCO by summer 2006, (9) but 
Russian Defense Minister Ivanov, when asked about Iran and the SCO, rejected 
any “moronic ideas” of the organization defending Iran. (10)  His statement 
contrasts with that of another Russian official, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the eccentric 
head of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), who stated 
that he would like to see Iran become part of the SCO, a view echoed by China 
in a formal invitation to Iran to attend this year’s SCO summit. (11)  Although the 
SCO is not primarily a military alliance, it does hold military cooperation 
exercises, an aspect in which Iran is particularly interested, given its recent 
military improvements. (12) 
 
CasFor might have been a successful initiative if Iran had more  of a naval force 
in the Caspian Sea. Instead, Iran perceived Russia, the only nation with a 
reasonable sea force in the Caspian, as encroaching on its space rather than as 
a partner for military cooperation. (13)  That is, after all, something Iran seems to 
be searching for intently; a dependable, powerful ally. Russia, which has become 
a major exporter of weapons and needs gainful employment for its nuclear 
scientists, complements Iran’s situation on those fronts. Each has different 
alignments in the international arena, leading to a confluence of interest in the 
other’s potential capabilities; Russia’s stature in the West and resurgent influence 
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in the Middle East could be enhanced by cordial relations with a newly assertive 
Iran, as much as the latter could benefit from a political buffer with the West 
offered by Russia. Both states are major exporters of petroleum and could 
benefit from a concerted, rather than competitive, effort in the energy sector. This 
type of complementary energy policy could be their best card in dealing with both 
China and the US. For now, though, Iran seems content to build up its military, 
and Russia has no reservations about exchanging military hardware for cash, to 
the tune of approximately $1 billion. (14) 
 
Russia and Iran have been expanding their collaboration to other fronts as well. 
In 2004, the two states “agreed to a joint program studying the UFO 
phenomenon after a series of sightings of unidentified flying objects” over 
Natanz, the location of an Iranian nuclear site. (15)  Obviously, the “joint 
program” was an attempt to block spy planes from observing Russian work on 
Iran’s nuclear facility, but the program stressed “expansion of bilateral 
cooperation particularly in space research and construction of satellites,” (16) 
which has apparently culminated in Iran wanting to send a man into space, an 
idea that was well received by Russia. The director of the Russian Centre for 
Modern Iranian Studies, Rajab Safarov,  suggests that Iran's sights are set on 
more than stars: “The idea of the first spaceflight by an Iranian is very attractive 
to Iran in the light of the country’s ambitions to become a key state not only in the 
region but in the whole Islamic world.” (17) 
 
As a plan to acquire its own nuclear power plants, Iran’s nuclear program 
receives high levels of domestic support; as a covert weapons program, it is not 
without significant criticism. A signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT), Iran is entitled to nuclear energy but forbidden from producing nuclear 
weapons. (18)  Such weapons were also declared un-Islamic in a religious 
decree by Iran’s first Supreme Ayatollah Khomeini after the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. (19)  Russia and China have supported Iran’s nuclear ambitions, in the 
face of US and wider international concern, by way of the veto power of each in 
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the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Russia insisting that more “concrete 
facts” would have to emerge regarding an Iranian nuclear weapons program 
before it would consider sanctions. (20)  Conventional wisdom presumes that 
sanctions would indeed punish Iran and are therefore a useful tool in diplomatic 
relations, but Jephraim Gundzik makes a strong argument to the contrary. (21) 
 
Gundzik’s article, featured in Asia Times, concludes that because the US will be 
able to gather only a small "coalition of the willing" to sanction Iran, one excluding 
China and Russia, the countries that apply the sanctions will eventually lose out 
to market forces and the winners would be, along with Iran, those countries that 
abstained from enacting sanctions. According to Gundzik’s scenario, the US 
could suffer a significant loss of credibility, especially if an unenforceable 
sanctions regime is linked with an unpopular war in Iraq. In terms of influence, 
economy, and cultural prestige, the US arguably still reigns supreme, but this 
status is not immutable. (22) 
 
 Recently, Russia and China have reversed their Security Council (UNSC) stance 
over potential sanctions against Iran, a shift the US likely sees as its diplomacy 
paying off. (23)  Even though Iran has claimed that sanctions are an abuse of 
international law and that it will continue to carry out its current peaceful nuclear 
activities regardless of Western dissent, the US probably views the agreement of 
Russia and China with the West in the Security Council (UNSC) as a positive 
development, as well as one that is potentially disruptive of Iranian nuclear 
activities. (24)  However, Russia and China did not agree to sanction Iran if it 
does not respond to UNSC pressure to suspend uranium enrichment temporarily, 
but merely to put sanctions on the table for discussion at the UNSC in that event. 
In pursuing a cautious approach, these two UNSC veto-wielding countries have 
bought additional time to formulate a plan with Iran, while allowing the latter to 
continue antagonizing the West. The key to deciphering whether or not Russia, 
China, and Iran are engaging in a plan to ensnare the US with the sanctions 
regime lies in Iran’s response to the Russian and Chinese "shift" over sanctions. 
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Interestingly, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani released a statement 
saying that Iran’s “long-term relations with Russia and China… could not be 
judged on the basis of one action only.” (25)  Clearly, Iran’s public response was 
measured. 
 
Russian foreign and domestic policies usually are crafted with the goal of 
enhancing Russia’s strength and prestige. In the words of Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov: 
 
Reforms are conducted in order to strengthen our country and to answer the 
challenges that we are tangibly aware of to the unity of our country and to its 
place in the world. The world needs a strong Russia because it is in everybody’s 
interests; if those who understand this see these reforms as being positive for our 
country and for the destinies of the world, then we believe that their assessment 
is correct. To all those who see a strong Russia as not being in the world’s best 
interest, this is not our problem. (26)  
 
Currently, Russia’s leaders seem to consider a nuclear-endowed Iran to be an 
important element in a policy to strengthen Russia’s international standing. If the 
two play this political game just right, they may have a winning hand, which could 
signify an alteration and likely a disturbing change to the balance of power in the 
world. In any event, cooperation between the two states is likely to increase in 
the short term, based on the opportunities each state creates for the other and 
the lack of disincentives created by the rest of the international community. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Anastasia Skoybedo 
 
GEORGIA 
Integrity, at all costs 
The struggle to maintain control of its territorial integrity has presented many 
challenges to Georgia's authorities, both from within and without Georgia.  The 
latest challenge comes in the form of Emzar Kvitsiani, a former presidential 
envoy to the Kodori Gorge (located in northwest Georgia, on the de facto border 
with Abkhazia) appointed by former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. 
(1)  Kvitsiani, who supported the Georgian efforts to reign in the Abkhaz 
separatists, apparently sided with Shevardnadze also in the Rose Revolution, 
and was subsequently dismissed from his official post and from the Georgian 
military by the Saakashvili government. 
 
Efforts to disarm Kvitsiani, whose Svani militia (also referred to as Monadire--
Hunter--Border Guards) is particularly influential in the Kodori Gorge, have been 
ineffective.  Kvitsiani's most recent announcement of his resolve not to disarm 
the militia was taken as provocation by the Georgian government, which then 
decided to insert troops to disarm the Monadire militia by force; in the early hours 
of 25 July, Georgia reportedly deployed a one thousand unit force into the Gorge. 
(2) 
 
Abkhaz, South Ossetian and Russian leaders are not convinced by the Georgian 
authorities' reassurances that the troop deployment is defensive and have 
accused Georgia of aggression.  The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a 
statement demanding the withdrawal of Georgian troops and argued that the 
operation could exacerbate tensions and be a source of needless confrontation. 
(3)  
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Several days before the Kodori operation, the Georgian Parliament 
overwhelmingly voted in favor of the withdrawal of Russian "peacekeepers" from 
the region, on the grounds of their being incompetent. (4)  The Georgian 
government also announced its intention to press the issue with OSCE 
representatives at the next meeting (to be held on 17-18 August). (5)  
Furthermore, on 21 July, Georgian Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi 
Khaindrava was dismissed without explanation. (6)  Separatist leaders Eduard 
Kokoity and Sergei Bagapsh deemed Khaindrava the last remaining moderate in 
the government.  Nonetheless, Bagapsh was confident the personnel moves 
would not deter negotiations: "I think that whether it is Khaindrava or someone 
else will not have an impact on the negotiating process. The main thing is that his 
[successor's] activities should be constructive and that the negotiating process 
does not fall apart." (7) 
 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and the Interior Minister Vano 
Meribashvili pronounced the operation in the gorge a success:  "Virtually every 
village is under control of the Interior Ministry.  It is completely calm there.  … For 
the first time in the past few years constitutional rule has been established in 
Kodori, and it has become a full-fledged part of Georgia." (8) 
 
There is dissent over the actual success of the operation however:  Kvitsiani was 
not captured (he is said to have escaped to Sukhumi) and the militias were not 
disbanded, with the exception of a dozen or so fighters who have surrendered. 
Criticism of the Georgian military leadership emerged as Kvitsiani claimed that 
the forces "do not know the area and cannot read maps.... We have a good army 
in Georgia. They are really good boys...but the commander...is an idiot. He 
knows nothing about military strategy." (9)  
 
There is speculation that Kvitsiani is hiding in Abkhazia or on Russian territory, 
(10) but whether his allegiances in the conflict have switched is still a matter for 
debate.  According to the dismissed former Georgian minister for Conflict 
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Resolution, Georgi Khaindrava, Kvitsiani is "not an enemy of Georgia, at least.  
He loves his country—and he loves Svanetia….  But the game he's playing now 
is very dangerous for Georgia and for himself." (11)   
 
Khaindrava certainly recognizes the possibility that any clashes in the region 
could spread, or be spread, to encompass wider areas of conflict, as well as the 
possibility that a personal grudge and some borrowed weapons could develop 
into something much more dangerous:  "The Russians are eagerly awaiting any 
spark of conflict on Georgian territory.  Kvitsiani must understand that. … I don't 
think Kvitsiani is working for the Russians.  He might be using something from 
their arsenals, but only temporarily. Whether he means to or not, he is furthering 
their purposes." (12) 
 
NORTH CAUCASUS 
Amnesty, anyone?  
In keeping with tradition, the Chechen rebel government published a peace 
manifesto three day after Basayev’s death. The proposition, published on the 
rebel site chechenpress.org and signed by Foreign Minister Akhmed Zakayev, 
called for immediate negotiations between the two parties without any 
“preconditions.” (13)  The Russian leadership ignored the initiative, but on July 19 
issued its own amnesty program, offered by the Director of the FSB, Nikolai 
Patrushev. (14)  There have been five or six amnesty offers in the past decade. 
All of these amnesty rounds ended in general failure and resulted in abductions, 
torture, and disappearances among the population. Coupled with the general 
lawlessness that currently permeates the North Caucasus, the population is more 
than reluctant to surrender its weapons or even to mention an allegiance with the 
rebels. Not surprisingly, by the initial deadline (1 August) only 70 rebels had 
surrendered, prompting Nikolai Patrushev to extend the deadline until 30 
September. (15) 
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The amnesty initiative backfired on 8 August when a Dagestani prosecutor Bitar 
Bitarov was assassinated by a parked car exploding along his route to work in 
Buinaksk. (16)  When Dagestan's Interior Minister Adilgerei Magomedtagirov set 
out to investigate the incident, his motorcade was ambushed by rebels on the 
way from Makhachkala to Buinaksk. (17)  On 10 August in Ingushetia, there was 
an attempt on the life of Nazran Prosecutor Gerikhan Khazbiyev, resulting in the 
deaths of his younger brother and thirteen neighbors. (18) 
 
The Russian government claims there is a connection among these three attacks 
and attributes them to the rebels' resolve to prevent other fighters from 
surrendering in response to Russia's offer of amnesty. Moreover, Russia expects 
more attacks to take place in other regions of the North Caucasus. (19)  The fact 
that these attacks have taken place supports Doku Umarov’s statement that 
resistance will exist and continue even without Basayev.  (20)  That attacks have 
happened outside Chechnya suggests that resistance has spread elsewhere, 
and that Chechnya no longer occupies the central position in the rebellion. 
However, these attacks only play into the hands of the Russian government; the 
rebels' reluctance to surrender and to take advantage of the amnesty provides an 
excuse for Russia's security services to implement harsher operations and to 
eschew negotiations, which reinforces Russia’s preferred policy throughout the 
conflict. When coupled with the decision to pursue new charges against Ahmed 
Zakayev, the fiercest advocate of a fast political settlement, the amnesty 
campaign appears to be one more PR attempt by the Russian leadership to allow 
them to avoid negotiations. It seems that Russia has not abandoned its chosen 
course of action after all. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Romania offers Kazakhstan an oil route bypassing Russia 
In early July, at a meeting of the Romanian-Kazakhstani Inter-Governmental 
Joint Commission on Commercial, Economic, Technical and Scientific 
Cooperation in Bucharest, the State Secretary of Romania’s Ministry of Economy 
and Trade (MEC) made an offer to the Kazakh government that it would be 
unwise to refuse. (1)  The Romanian official offered his Kazakh counterpart the 
opportunity to export oil to Western Europe via the proposed Constanta-Trieste 
Pipeline (CTPL), which would carry oil from the Romanian Black Sea coast as far 
as Italy, where the pipeline would connect to the Trans Alpine Pipeline (TAP), 
which transports oil to Germany and Austria. (2)  The Constanta-Trieste pipeline 
project has been under consideration since at least 1999, when the results of the 
first feasibility study conducted by a team of US and Romanian companies (led 
by Parsons Energy and Chemicals Group of Houston and HLP Associates of 
New York) were published.  The results were favorable, declaring that the 
proposed route was viable and predicting that the 1400 km pipeline could be 
operational as early as the latter half of 2002. (3)  Additional feasibility studies 
undertaken in response to changes in the proposed pipeline’s route (4) have also 
been favorable. 
 
Unfortunately, the pipeline project has attracted neither sufficient funding nor the 
approval of all five of the countries through which it is to be built—Slovenia’s 
parliament has yet to sign off on the project, due to its concerns that the 
pipeline’s economic benefits will not outweigh the environmental risks. (5)  The 
overall advantages to the CPTL are many: its route would take it through 
countries that are politically stable; the Caspian oil which it would transport is of 
higher quality and has a lower sulfur content than the Russian crude oil that is 
currently exported to Europe via the Druzhba pipeline; it avoids the risk of 
sending large tanker ships through the Bosphorus Straits; and it is not dependent 
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on the use of any Russian-controlled pipelines. (6)  This last point is the one 
which hopefully will garner the project the overwhelming support of both 
European oil consumers and Caspian oil exporters, such as Kazakhstan.  There 
are other pipeline proposals being considered – one would link the Bulgarian 
Black Sea Coast with Greece, another would link Bulgaria and Albania, however 
these export routes would depend on Russian-controlled pipelines for their oil 
supplies. (7)  At present, there are only two pipelines carrying Caspian oil that 
bypass Russia entirely: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) route and the pipeline 
from central Kazakhstan to China.  Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev recently 
signed an agreement with Azerbaijan to start transporting 7.5-10 million tons of 
oil annually to Europe via the BTC.  Beginning in 2008, this figure may also 
include oil from the Kashagan field, (8) which is reported to be the largest oil field 
outside the Middle East and the world’s fifth largest in terms of its reserves. (9) 
 
Using the BTC route will enable Kazakhstan to decrease its dependence on the 
Russian-controlled Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which connects 
Kazakhstan’s western oil fields with the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, 
and will provide the Kazakh government with at least one alternative, should 
Russia decide to increase transit fees for the CPC and/or reduce Kazakhstan’s 
access to the CPC route.  Since Kazakhstan’s oil production levels are still far 
below their predicted potential, the BTC pipeline currently has more than enough 
capacity to handle Kazakh oil exports, however once the country’s four largest oil 
fields (Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kurmangazy, and Kashagan) are fully on-line, at 
least one more pipeline will be needed. (10)  One must also keep in mind that 
given the current situation in Georgia, Russia yet may have the opportunity to 
bring at least part of the BTC pipeline under its dominion.  Construction of the 
CTPL would allow Kazakhstan unfettered access to the European petroleum 
market, regardless of what happens in the Caucasus, and would provide Europe 
with a stable and reliable source of energy while reducing the possibility that both 
Kazakhstan and Europe could be held hostage to the Russian Federation’s 
growing appetite for international influence.  The CTPL project still faces not 
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inconsiderable logistical hurdles, but even in the face of these obstacles, 
Romania’s offer to the Kazakh government is worth its weight in (black) gold. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Changing of the guard 
On 15-16 August, new Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych made his first 
official trip abroad to Russia to attend the Eurasian Economic Community 
Summit (EurAsEC).  Ukraine is not a member of the community, which loosely 
comprises the Central Asian states, Russia and Belarus, but the country 
maintains observer status.  
 
The visit gained significant media attention since it was the first official meeting of 
pro-Russian Yanukovych with his Russian counterpart Mikhail Fradkov, and with 
Russian President Vladimir Putin.  The main question discussed by the media 
before the meeting was whether a new gas deal would be reached with a lower 
gas price for Ukraine.  The issue remained unresolved, although Yanukovych 
attempted (not entirely successfully) to suggest that significant progress was 
made.     
 
However, Yanukovych’s trip to Sochi suggests that the way foreign policy has 
been handled in Ukraine by President Viktor Yushchenko may be changing.  The 
fact that Yanukovych was granted permission by Yushchenko (who has 
responsibility for the country’s foreign policy) to take this trip, may signify a shift 
in the president’s handling of international questions.  
 
During the governments of Ukraine’s two previous prime ministers under 
Yushchenko, forays by the prime ministers into foreign policy were significantly 
discouraged.  This is particularly true of the Yulia Tymoshenko government; 
Tymoshenko repeatedly was refused permission by Yushchenko to travel on 
behalf of the country.  
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Even Yushchenko’s close ally Yuriy Yekhanurov did not travel to meet with 
presidents of other countries. His one trip to Russia in September 2005, for a 
meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov also included Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk.  
 
Tarasyuk was left in Ukraine this week, as Yanukovych’s close allies traveled 
with him to Russia. 
 
Sources close to the presidential administration suggest that it would have been 
inappropriate for Yushchenko and Tarasyuk to attend the EurAsEC Summit, 
since the country only participates as an observer.  They also suggest that all 
discussions at the summit dealt solely with economic, not foreign policy, issues.  
However, Armenian President Robert Kocharian attended the summit, even 
though his country maintains observer status.  
 
More importantly, while in Russia, Yanukovych met for an hour with President 
Putin.  He later announced that he had discussed with Kazakh President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev the possibility of increasing gas supplies to Ukraine, as 
well as his country’s participation in oil field exploration.  (1)  He also met with 
Uzbekistan's President and Kyrgyz state television reported that: “President 
Islam Karimov received Ukrainian Premier Minister Viktor Yanukovych at his 
residence in the second day of the visit, before the Sochi informal summit.  The 
talks mainly focused on the issues of developing and further boosting relations 
between Uzbekistan and Ukraine, especially economic and trade cooperation, 
and the future of the projects, which are jointly implemented by the two countries 
in the framework of organizations of which they are members, as well as 
geopolitical events taking place in the world.”  (2) 
 
Yanukovych also once again promised to protect the Russian language, and 
expressed his country’s interest in deepening its involvement in the Single 
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Economic Space (SES), a move Yushchenko previously has rejected as 
incongruous with the country’s shift westward.  (SES comprises Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan in a plan for economic integration.) (3) 
 
As Yanukovych met with other regional leaders, the President’s office 
announced, “Victor Yushchenko has visited the National Institute of Grapes and 
Wine in Yalta to discuss prospects of Ukraine’s wine-making industry and 
viniculture, and ways to cultivate new varieties of grape.” (4) 
 
On Aug 17, Yuschenko was briefed by Yanukovych about his meetings, and 
although no documents were signed, he congratulated the Prime Minister for 
“[managing] to ensure gas supplies stipulated in the January 2006 agreement 
between Ukraine and Russia.”  (5)  The president’s press office also noted that 
the two had discussed Ukraine’s integration into NATO and the WTO.  Once 
again, Foreign Minister Tarasyuk was not present, although he met with 
Yushchenko separately on the same day.  
 
These apparent additional policy-related duties for the Prime Minister come at a 
time when Yanukovych has seen his domestic powers increased by recently 
enacted constitutional amendments.  However, the foreign policy of the country 
remains firmly in the president’s portfolio—as the president has repeatedly 
pointed out and as his website underscores:  “The President as Head of State 
acts on behalf of Ukraine, represents Ukraine on the international scene, 
negotiates and signs international treaties and is in charge of foreign policy of the 
state."  (6) 
 
Given the events of recent days, it seems that this statement may no longer be 
entirely accurate. 
 
Yanukovych moves toward manual price adjustment 
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On 14 August, Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych made a number of 
announcements.  He pledged to pay wage arrears, lower taxes, protect 
producers from the negative effects of joining the WTO and “slow down the 
growth of oil and fuel prices.”  The latter, he said, would be done “by market 
means only.” (7)  However, actions so far suggest that the Yanukovych 
government may be prepared to use "administrative methods" to control prices.  
 
In the recently (and quietly) signed “Memorandum on the Concordance of 
Actions between the Cabinet and Gas Traders,” 60 percent of companies 
providing petrol to Ukraine agreed to cap retail gas prices at 4.7 hryvnya per liter 
(93 cents) and diesel prices at 4.1 hryvnya per liter (82 cents) for one week.   The 
measure came, according to new Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Boyko, after 
fuel prices rose more than 10 percent in three weeks.  Boyko did not specify 
which companies had signed the memorandum, and no information about the 
document appears on the Cabinet’s otherwise comprehensive website.  (8) 
 
Before the deal was announced, Yanukovych and Boyko held a meeting with oil 
company representatives that reportedly included TNK-BP, Lukoil, Tatneft and 
Alliance Oil – Russian companies that control the majority of Ukraine's retail gas 
market. Prior to this meeting, Yanukovych said he hoped to persuade the 
companies to sign the deal and to avoid the use of "administrative methods" to 
obtain lower prices. (9) 
 
However, Boyko told reporters on 14 August that retail outlets that refuse to 
comply with the price caps set in the memorandum would be barred from 
receiving their petrol supplies from the country’s refineries.  (10) It is unclear 
whether Ukraine has the authority to stop the supplies.  Furthermore, it is unclear 
what will happen when the one week period covered by the memorandum ends.  
Will there be a new agreement?  What if oil prices rise again?  Will the price caps 
increase? 
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Valery Ryashin, a spokesman for Lukoil Ukraine, voiced no objection to the 
memorandum, because, he said, “cap prices for this week correspond with 
market prices for this week.”  What will happen when they don’t? (11) 
 
Ukraine’s influential Ukrayinska Pravda website recently reminded readers that in 
2004, the previous Yanukovych government signed a similar memorandum with 
gas retailers.  Despite assurances that the cap would increase if world prices 
increased, the government demanded that prices remain low.  The site 
suggested it is likely that “the situation will develop along the lines of 2004,” when 
“administrative methods” won out over “the market.” (12) 
 
This scenario, of course, is by no means assured.  However, one wonders why a 
“cap” would be instituted if the government intended to let prices float with the 
market.  Why bother?  
 
If the Yanukovych government insists that the established price caps not change, 
what will be the response of the Russian oil companies?  These companies 
loudly criticized the 2005 pro-Western government of Yulia Tymoshenko for 
pushing them to sign a similar agreement.  In that case, when market prices 
outpaced the caps, the oil companies simply stopped providing petrol, which 
caused a supply crisis.  Many analysts suggest that the Tymoshenko government 
never fully recovered from the backlash.  
 
What might the response be to a pro-Russian prime minister using similar 
methods?  Will he also have to endure a supply interruption or will some 
accommodation be made?  The next several weeks will demonstrate much about 
the commitment of both the Yanukovych government and the Russian oil 
companies to a free market.  
 
MOLDOVA 
Two Vladimirs and the status quo 
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Despite the valiant efforts of Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin to suggest that 
important progress was made during his recent meeting with Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, it is clear that the Moldova-Russia relationship remains mired in 
mutual distrust and recrimination. 
 
“The results of the meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Voronin said, 
“inspire optimism that problems existing in bilateral relations will be solved and 
represent a serious step forward, unfreezing the strategic relations between our 
countries.”  (13)  However, the fact that this comment came a full day after the 
meeting, as Voronin returned to Chisinau, seemed to contradict the Moldovan 
president’s words.  
 
No joint statement was issued following the meeting.  The presidents did not 
meet the press together the Russian side still has not commented on the 
discussion between Putin and Voronin.  In other words, it was more of the same 
for Russia and Moldova. 
 
This is, no doubt, a blow to Voronin, who arrived in Moscow on 8 August with a 
list of outstanding bilateral problems. 
 
High on Voronin’s list is Russia’s continued embargo on the import of Moldovan 
wine, cheese and certain meats, citing what it calls health concerns.  The 
country, however, has produced no documentation supporting its health claims.  
Furthermore, the embargoes were announced following the implementation of 
stricter customs regulations on products from the pro-Russian separatist republic 
of Transnistria—suggesting a clear political motive for the measures.  
 
The loss of wine exports to Russia alone has cost the country tens of millions of 
dollars.  According to Moldovan Finance Minister Mihai Pop, wine exports 
generally make up 30% of the country’s GDP; 80% of these exports were to 
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Russia.  (14)   Voronin left Moscow, however, with no agreement to allow once 
again the import of Moldovan wine. 
 
Voronin also reportedly traveled to Moscow with several proposals for settling the 
problem of Russian troops deployed in Transnistria.  According to analyst 
Vladimir Socor, “Moldova would issue a flattering statement on Russia’s 
‘peacekeeping’ operation and declare that it has completely achieved its goals; 
the troops would withdraw with full honors; an international mission of observers, 
part military and part civilian, would seamlessly replace Russia’s troops; Moldova 
would grant ‘broad autonomy’ to Transnistria, consistent with European 
standards of autonomy for regions within states.” (15) 
 
Judging from his silence, Putin did not agree.  
 
In fact, statements from Russian representatives over the last year suggest that 
the country is prepared to maintain its presence in Moldova despite having no 
legal standing to maintain its troops on foreign territory, and despite repeated 
international calls for them to leave.  What, after all, is any country or 
international organization truly prepared to do to force them to disengage?  As 
the international community increasingly is preoccupied with other regions of the 
world, Voronin went to Russia with little support.  To his credit, he also went 
unprepared to provide any major concessions to Russia, be they Moldovan state 
property or territory.  He, therefore, received the answer one would expect. 
 
Russia's response had a predictable effect on the leaders of the separatist 
region—it further emboldened them in their refusal to negotiate with Moldovan 
representatives.  Instead, the region is pressing on with its plans to hold a 
“referendum on independence.” The referendum is now set for 17 September, 
and appears to be intended to imitate the referendum that won Montenegro its 
independence from Serbia earlier this year.  
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At a meeting of pro-Russian separatist leaders following the Montenegran 
referendum, Sergei Bagapsh, Eduard Kokoity and Igor Smirnov of Abkhazia 
(Georgia), South Ossetia (Georgia) and Transnistria, respectively, adopted a joint 
statement calling for their independence to be recognized. They suggested “the 
completion of the political and legal formalization of the breakup of the USSR 
through the recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia, the Dniester Moldovan 
Republic and the Republic of South Ossetia as entities subject to the operation of 
international law.''  (16) 
   
Of course, the three republics above have little in common with Montenegro.  
The new Republic of Montenegro already has established democratic, economic 
and military systems that meet international standards.  The country is not 
subsidized completely by a third state, has not been called a “black hole of 
smuggling,” (17) and most importantly, is not supported by foreign troops 
stationed illegally on its territory.  Could the separatist republics survive alone 
without Georgia, Moldova and Russia?  Almost certainly not.  
 
Transnistria has no free media and no history of free and fair elections.  In fact, 
during Ukraine’s presidential election, seven polling stations established for 
ethnic Ukrainians were judged to be below international electoral standards by 
election observers.  
 
The former Ukrainian Minister of Culture, Oksana Bilozir, served as a coordinator 
of election monitors in Transnistria.  She returned to Kyiv with a litany of 
complaints. She said, "We anticipated the possibility of rigging, which is why we 
sent two journalists and one foreign observer to each polling station.  All cars 
were stopped, people were arrested, video cameras with which they were 
supposed to record violations were broken.  Journalist Klebanskyy was deported 
within on [sic] hour, and when he crossed the Ukrainian border he was followed 
by the warning that he would be killed if he decided to come back."  Bilozir also 
reported that the head of the Dniester Ukrainian Association, who was serving as 
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an official observer, was severely beaten by being kicked in the face, while 
numerous other observers were detained and deported.  (18) 
 
Nevertheless, on 17 September, Transnistria will hold its referendum, and 
President Putin seems content with the situation.  When asked about the 
separatist republics being supported by Russian troops and other subsidies, he 
said, "Whatever we may decide to begin with, if we are to make decisions in a 
democratic fashion, the opinion of the people must be studied first thing.''  (19)  
 
The referendum, of course, already fails to meet international standards thanks 
to the absence of free media that allow alternative opinions to be aired.  But the 
outcome undoubtedly will be duly noted and publicized by Russia.  Perhaps that 
is the only certain result of the meeting between Voronin and Putin. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Ukrayinska Pravda, 2111 CET, 16 Aug 06 via www.pravda.com.ua, and 
ForUm, 1030 CET, 16 Aug 06; via en.for-ua.com/news. 
(2) Uzbek Television First Channel, 1200 GMT, 16 Aug 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Ukrayinska Pravda, 2111 CET, 16 Aug 06 via www.pravda.com.ua, and 
ForUm, 1030 CET, 16 Aug 06 via en.for-ua.com/news. 
(4) Press office of President Victor Yushchenko, 1526 CET, 16 Aug 06 via 
www.president.gov.ua/en.  
(5) Press office of President Victor Yushchenko, 1242 CET, 17 Aug 06 via 
www.president.gov.ua/en. 
(6) “Presidential Authority,” Official Website of the President of Ukraine via 
www.president.gov.ua/en.  
(7) ICTV, 0945 GMT, 14 Aug 06; via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) AFX (Associated Press), 1911 GMT, 14 Aug 06; via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) Eastbusiness.org, 1212 CET, 11 Aug 06; via Lexis-Nexis. 
 45 
(10) AFX, op. cit. and Interfax-Ukraine, 1241 EET, 14 Aug 06; via 
www.energy.interfax.kiev.ua 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “Gas Memorandum,” Ukrayinska Pravda, 14 Aug 06 via 
www.pravda.com.ua. 
(13) Basapress News Agency, 9 Aug 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) Associated Press Financial, 14:39 GMT, 14 Apr 06 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) Vladimir Socor, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 10 Aug 06 via www.jamestown.org.  
(16) ITAR-TASS, 1121 EST, 15 Jun 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(17) Tomiuc, Eugene, "Moldova: President Calls for International Peacekeepers 
in Breakaway Transdniester Region," 24 Sep 04 via www.rferl.org.  
(18) Ukrayina Moloda, 23 Nov04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(19) ITAR-TASS, op. cit. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2006 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol12/ed1208.html. 
